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Chapter 5
Pedagogic judgement
Introduction
Teachers make judgements all the time. They also make and take decisions,
issue instructions, negotiate, react, respond and listen. Often they are doing
these things in rapid succession over a long period of time and that is why
teaching can be so exhausting but also exhilarating. To be caught up in the
ow with young children and adults who are learning with excitement is an
endorphin packed ride. Research about these activities comes from a variety
of perspectives. Sometimes a sociological perspective can reveal issues about
the structure and dynamics of classroom spaces such as the hidden but per-
nicious inuence of class, gender, and race on the lived experience of those
participants in this form of social life, and classrooms are quite curious places
when viewed anthropologically. Psychologists may be more concerned with
individual functioning such as the role of character, theories of learning, and
particularly fashionable at the moment is the growth of educational neuro-
psychology - theories of learning that emphasise the role of the brain. Where
philosophers dier from these types of empirical researcher, that is research
that emphasises the role of observational evidence in constructing arguments,
is that philosophers are also concerned with the normative. Normative ar-
gument is presecriptive rather than descriptive; it concerns what we ought
to do rather than merely describe what it is that we do. The philosopher
David Hume identied that the gap between what is the case and what ought
to be case is not straightforward. For example, we know from evidence that
there are dierent outcomes in the schooling system depending on what type
of school you attend. Those attending private schools tend to go on to have
very dierent types of career and life experience than those attending state
schools. This is a statement of what is the case. What ought we do about
it? Well we could advocate for the common school or we might adopt an
acadamisation programme, such as that recently embarked upon by Michael
Gove and the Conservative Government of 2010-2015. What we ought to do
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does not proceed automatically from what is the case.
In this chapter I examine three philosophical paradigms of what may count
as `good' judgement. The implication being that we ought to aspire to making
these types of judgment as often or as well we can. I go on to show how each
of these forms of judgement can be recognised in good P4C practice but how
that there are tensions between the forms. It is simply not possible to be like
this all the time and sometimes dierent forms may work against one another.
In the same way that tackling inequality in the school system comes down to
competing value systems worked out in the political arena, so the professional
teacher must reconcile dierent values - of herself, her children, her school
and wider context - and this will inuence what types of judgement at which
she tries to arrive. Having conscious choice that there is more than one way
might be liberating and this chapter provides a framework for reective and
reexive deliberation and scope for further reading. The rst model, Judge-
ment as wise action, draws on the philosophy of Aristotle and practitioners
will recognise the description of the practically wise teacher-as-judge. Kant
informs the second model, Judgement as truth, where we focus on how truth
in the form of truthful statements or propositions underpin much of what is
valued in educational research and policy discourses. Here we also understand
the value based upon so-called `objective measurements' such as school at-
tainment league tables. Dewey is a controversial gure in education, often
wrongly identied with the `progressivism', and the section on Judgment as
inquiry describes Dewey's belief in the value of inquiry in underpinning good
educational action. If we do not teach according to the children's interests,
then why should we expect them to be interested in their and our world?
The nal section of the chapter considers the relationship between these
three models and the critical diculties this might throws up for the prac-
titioner. I draw on recent developments in philosophy that are controversial
and still being actively worked out by philosophers but when we consider
Judgement as negotiation / exploration then we are invited to consider a rad-
ically revised understanding of our ethical relationship to children as beings
and how we might facilitate their encounter with the world and each other.
Here the assumption is that we live in a world of plurality and dierence and
helping children navigate that is the best thing we can do as teachers. I con-
clude by addressing how each of these models can be found in P4C practice
and theoretical literature and future directions for the interested reader to
consider.
Judgement as wise action
The model of the wise teacher has its roots in the ancient Greek philosopher,
Aristotle (c. 384 c. 322 BCE). Of course other wisdom traditions trace their
sages back far further than these dates, but for our purposes Aristotle is a
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key gure. Aristotle not only taught across the eld of human endeavour
known at the time, for example as tutor to the young aristocrat who would
become Alexander the Great, but also developed a vast body of knowledge that
includes philosophy that still has considerable inuence on our thought today.
To understand Aristotle we need to focus on two key ideas: that his work is
teleological and empirical. By teleology I mean that for Aristotle everything
unfolds or develops or is caused according to its proper function or reason
for being. Aristotle is trying to provide explanations based on the observable
facts, that is empirical data or observation, upon which he then inductively
builds a more abstract philosophy. For example, he draws on empirical work in
what we now call physics, astronomy, and biology to develop a metaphysical1
theory of causation. The relevance of this is that Aristotle sees everything
unfolding according to rules and laws and necessity. Children must become
adults because that is their potential and education will help bring them to
that state (Stables, 2008, For a fuller critical treatment of this see). This also
applies to knowledge and understanding in what Aristotle called the practical
arts. One can have theoretical knowledge of the world theoria, for example
through mathematics (think Pythagoras' theorem); one can also have technical
knowledge or technique, called techne if one has a determinate object such as a
vase or a poem that one wishes to construct or make; however, there is a third
class of knowledge called phronesis or practical wisdom. Some elds such as
politics require more than a technical knowledge of not just how to arrive at
a determined end but also require the wise practitioner to reect on the ends
themselves; thus to act well or virtuosly the practitioner must consider what
they are working towards as well as how they are accomplishing it.
It has been argued by philosophers of education that much contempor-
ary professional educational practice over-emphasises technical concerns at
the expense of deliberative and considered practical wisdom. David Carr, for
example, argued that educational professionalism that is based on technical
eciency (we might consider teaching to the exam to be such an example) is a
reductive or restricted idea of what it means to be a professional teacher (Carr,
2000). Dunne (1993) argued in `Back to the Rough Ground' that phronesis is
characterised by an immediate and specic understanding of what is the case
here and now. Technical and theoretical knowledge is meant to apply univer-
sally (Smith, 1995, :210) but practical wisdom pays attention to the specic
case at hand. The latter requires a particular sensitivity or understanding
that goes beyond the theoretical. It explains why an experienced teacher
may choose not to apply a rule that a novice teacher might enforce rigidly.
When an experienced teacher hears a classroom noise that their ITE student
ignores, maybe because the latter does not yet know how to respond through
lack of experience, the former may peer over their glasses and quietly en-
quire `Everything OK, Abbie? What do you need to help you concentrate?'2.
Simply put, the wise judge of Aristotle's philosophy, sees more, reects, con-
siders and deliberates more, and acts better as a result of their unique type of
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judgement. There is a normative element to this as well. Judgement that is
of the type recognisable as phronesis is a desirable quality; we should prefer
that our teachers are capable of exercising this type of judgement as much
as is deemed appropriate by the phronimos themselves. At the end of the
chapter I will consider how much P4C practice encourages the development
of phronesis in the facilitator.
Judgement as truth
Aristotle's impact on the ancient European and, via Rome, the subsequent
medieval worldview cannot be underestimated. Apart from doctrinally signi-
cant borrowings from Plato such as the realm of forms standing outside of the
world, Aristotle's systematic philosophical worldview is allied with medieval
christian doctrine and used to explain how the world is. This worldview is able
to sit comfortably for a while with the growth of scientic methods of under-
standing and explanation. Scientic knowledge, however, based on evidence,
method, procedure and reasoning comes to provide an increasing challenge to
some of the fundamental assumptions in the Catholic understanding of the
cosmos. One of the biggest challenges is the shift from a geocentric to a helio-
centric conception of the solar system. Whereas in Aristotle's philosophy the
world is the starting point and all other things are understood in relationship
to this reference point, in the heliocentric model the Sun sits at the centre
and around it all things revolve. This shift in worldview is known as the Co-
pernican Revolution and it lies at the heart of a corresponding revolution in
philosophical thought.
In the second of his three monumental Critiques, Kant wrote ``Two things
ll the mind with ever-increasing wonder and awe, the more often and the
more intensely the mind of thought is drawn to them: the starry heavens
above me and the moral law within me" (Kant, 1999b, p.269). The philo-
sophical problem that Kant is setting out to resolve, and he refers to his
solution as a `Copernican revolution' in philosophy, is reconciling knowledge
and belief (understanding according to our reason) to sensible experience; and
then additionally reconciling these understandings with the idea of our free
will and necessity to act according to our conscience rather than someone
else's idea of what is right, that is `received wisdom'. Before Kant, metaphys-
ics is concerned with essence and knowledge of things-in-themselves but the
Western Enlightenment undermines Aristotelian/Catholic metaphysics. This
undermining occurs in three forms: Hume's skepticism, Locke's empiricism
and what Kant terms `indierentism' (towards the necessity of metaphysics).
Kant is therefore concerned to create a form of metaphysics that acknowledges
both scientic inquiry and knowledge, and subjective moral law.
In Kant's philosophy, judgement is the creation of a unied understanding
of the world that blends our intuitive appraisal of the world with the underly-
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ing cocneptual structure of consciousness understanding. Most famously this
is expressed in the rst critique thus ``Thoughts without intuitions are empty,
intuitions without concepts are blind.'' (Kant, 1999a, :75). For Kant, the
world outside of us is fundamentally unknowable in itself, we can never know
the noumenal realm, instead we come to understand the phenomenal world,
the world as it appears to us. Our representations of the world then are bound
up in our conceptual understanding and this propositional representation can
be ascertained as more as less true. We can and must put our truths to the
test and the demand of the enlightenment is no one should ever take anything
at face value, hence the slogan sapere aude - 'Dare to know'.
When teachers are assessing a child's understanding, they are engaged in
making judgements of truth; when league tables of school assessment perform-
ance are compiled, they are presented as representations of the world that are
a truthful picture; when agents of accountability, such as in the UK OFS-
TED, make pronouncements ostensibly against criteria, then judgements of
truth are being made. Philosophers of education make the argument that this
form of rationality is so pervasive in western public that it is hard to perceive
that it is only one form of judgement amongst many and does not deserve its
preeminence. However, like a sh asked 'How's the water' and who replies
'What is water?', we may not perceive the tides of rationality which we as
individuals and teachers are swimming. This form of judgment might then
be said to be so strongly normative that we do not notice its prevalence in
our classrooms and our everyday interactions with one another in schools and
classrooms.
[little bit more needed on instrumental and scientic rationality]
Judgement as inquiry
The third type of judgement I would like to consider is based on the philosophy
of the American, John Dewey (18xx-1953). Both Aristotle and Kant share a
basic philosophical assumption about the world. This assumption is dualist:
that there is fundamental distinction between the self and the world. We have
subjective selves and we have objective worlds. Philosophy, amongst other
traditions of thought, concerns itself with the relationships between these two
binary aspects. Dewey was concerned to develop a non-dualistic philosophy
where a self and its environment were seen to be an integrated whole, not
two separate parts that are inter-related. In this non-dualistic philosophy the
self and its environment are seen to be continuous with one another. The
habits or customs of thought are seen as adaptations and responses to the
person's experience of their environment. On the one hand this can be useful
as it allows us to take cognitive shortcuts by using concepts and habits that
have proved to be eective before in similar situations. However, a person can
get also get into habitual or xed interactions or responses with their world
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that become stereotypes and a poor response to the actual exigencies of the
situation.
At the heart of Dewey's philosophy is his 1938 work `Logic: The Theory
of Inquiry' (LW12 ). Dewey's theory of judgement is highly technical and
so I present here a sketch of the salient core concepts. As with any sketch
this can only give an impression of this work, which is deserving of greater
attention than can be provided here. The rst aspect to consider is how
judgment resolves and indeterminate situation into a determinate one. When
something becomes problematic for an organism in its environment then this
is a state of indeterminancy. This can be met by one of two responses -
habitual, stereotypical and rule-bound action - if the mindset of this response
were voiced it might be something like: "This is what I do here", or "This is
what this situation/person/place is like", or "This is what ought/must/should
be done here.". The other response is to engage in inquiry, which is much
more of an active investigation of what is the situation or case, here and now,
and that inquiry eventually resolves into a new judgement or determinate
conclusion. This judgement settles the matter for now so that the inquiry is
no longer ongoing although it might become reawakened at some later time.
There is an important implication of this conceptualisation of judgement,
namely that judgement is constructed and that it is active. Dewey regards pre-
vious work on philosophy as suering from `the spectator theory of knowledge'.
For example, in the previous section on Kant we saw how in his philosophy
knowledge is a representation or picture of the world and a good judgement
is the same as a true understanding of the world. This propositional under-
standing is fundamentally awed as far as Dewey is concerned because the is
nothing in the picture that we hold of the world that compels us to act on that
understanding. We may believe that poverty is evil and should be eradicated
yet a spectator view means we that observe this truth without feeling motiv-
ated to act upon it. For Dewey this observation or hypothesis or picture about
the world is not yet a full judgement. A full judgment is actually evaluative
as well as cognitive or epistemological. It is a position towards the world that
reects some scale of values and implies that in some way the world must or
will change according to the judgement that we have arrived at.
This distinction is at the heart of pragmatist philosophy. A truth's veracity
is established by the quality of the process by which it is arrived at, i.e. how
well justied it is. The meaning of the truth is how well it plays out in action.
If I claim that the world is fair, as a pragmatist I am not making a claim that is
like a photograph of the world "Here is a picture. Let us judge against crtieria.
Is it fair or not (judgement of kind)? To what extent is it fair (judgement of
degree)?". The pragmatist's truth is more like an unfolding video. If I believe
the world is fair, what happens as a result of me acting as if that were true?
How well justied is that judgement about truth I have arrived at? Hence, for
Dewey, our lives are fundamentally deliberative. Some concepts such as turth,
beauty and justice may be at the heart of a lifelong inquiry. For example, I
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write this chapter in a cafe in an Italian town, and I am appraising what
for me as a person "What constitutes the practically good life in a time of
change?". The philosophical dictum "Know thyself" is part of this attitude or
orientation that characterises pragmatism. It is an openness to inquiry and
judgement as a way of life.
Dewey can be claimed to be one of the most inuential philosophers on
educational thought and practice and as such his legacy is bitterly contested.
He is often and erroneously associated with `educational progressivism', long
a term of abuse amongst certain critics. Over recent years Richard Pring
in the UK has done much to carefully excavate the authentic Dewey from
the caricature portrayed by his critiques. Working carefully to expose the
binary or dualistic thinking that Dewey was at pains to combat, Pring oers
insights into how Dewey can help us consider the tension between diernt
functions or purposes of schooling [Monastry or marketplace; recent Dewey
books (Fesmire, Library on Dewey)]. In America Jim Garrison's work is of
similar stature [refs].
Plurality of judgement in P4C
Metajudgement: Judgements about judgement
Given the variety of ways of judging, how do we judge what type of judgement
might be good to use? Might this be a process of innite regress - in order
how to judge how to judge, do we then need to know how to judge how to
judge how to judge? It is, to use a technical philosophical phrase, turtles all
the way down. We encounter similar problems with other educational verbs
such as 'to learn' - when we ask at what point we might have learned how to
learn how to learn to. . . . Winch (xxxx) addresses this well when he points
out that `to learn' is a one of a class of verbs that need to relate to an object.
We `learn to. . . ' in the same way that we `judge that. . . '. How as a teacher,
or educational leader do I judge that my judgement is a good one here?
It is at this point that an appeal is often made to some metaprinciple or
process in educational literature such as `reective judgement' (Schhon, Pol-
lard). On examination we nd that principles such as these can be identied
with a particular philosophical tradition. Schon's categories of reection-in-ac-
tion and reection-on-action very much presuppose a Kantian consciousness.
Models of action inquiry (Kemmis, McNi) can trace their philsoophical roots
to Deweyan modes of inquiry. It is at this point I challenge a premise hitherto
not made explicit, that we must have rm ground upon which to stand when
we make judgements. I will argue in the rest of the chapter that teaching is
the type of professional activity where we can never be absolutely certain of
ourselves and that a fundamental aspect of being a teacher is living with un-
certainty and contingency - the latter term meaning that whatever we choose
to do, we could also have chosen otherwise.
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P4C then might be seen as a useful tool for helping understand how judge-
ments are arrived at, what underpins judgements such as evidence and facts,
explanations of how the facts justify the claim, how alternative explanations
ought be rejected, and how our claims are scoped i.e. do not always apply
across all times and spaces but apply to particular contexts. These last criteria
are drawn from a particular model of argumentation from Stephen Toulmin,
from the Deweyan tradition, about how arguments can be understood as a
function of their justication. In Lipman's original materials the focus is much
more on Aristotle's logic as the basis for sound argumentation even though
the process for forming sound arguments is then based on a Deweyan mode
of inquiry. Dierent traditions of P4C inquiry can be critically understood
against these philosophical traditions. For example, McCall (200x, ch6) ana-
lyses the dierent Kantian and Deweyan inuences that distinguish between
her specic Community of Philosophical Inquiry approach from the English
and Welsh more Deweyan tradition3.
Judgement as dialogue, relating and cartography
The traditions of thought of three classic philosophers can give rise to dierent
modes of judgement but it might be more helpful to consider a body of work
rather than a specic philosopher that dwell on P4C as a process for arriving at
sound judgments. What weaves these thinkers together is a motif of judgement
as a dialogue, and/or a radically open-ended negotiation. The rst three
modes of judgement are recognisable as types of judgements that teachers
may do in the classroom or whilst engaged in their practice. Here I want to
consider judgement as social processes involving pluralities and multiplicities
of people, sites, contexts and relationships.
David Kennedy's work The Well of Being marked an important turning
point in the P4C literature. It was the rst full-scale treatment of postmodern
themes such as intersubjectivity in the context of philosophising with children.
Postmodernism was and is an intellectual movement that by its very nature is
hard to dene since it fundamentally rejects the idea that meaning and den-
itions can be xed or in other words that we can get to the essence of things.
Opponents of postmodernism often accuse it of philosophical relativism, the
idea that ideas are in some way a product of their time, place and location,
whereas postmodernists do not nd this accusation as troubling but instead
a good place from which to start inquiry. Francois Lyotard famously said of
postmodernism that it marked `the end of grand narrative' - all encompassing
systems of ideas that aim at explaining everything, such as Marxism, Kan-
tian philosophy or any other -ism such as empiricism. For postmodernists
it is the process of knowledge production, and the conditions that give rise
to the possibility of socially recognised knowledge, that matter more perhaps
than the substance of what is said. Kennedy's work is important therefore
for recognising that the historical child-adult relationship, stretching in the
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West back to the Aristotelian decit model, and enshrined in Piagetian psy-
chology, fundamentally limited the possibilities of children. Schooling further
perpetuated such restrictive and limiting relationships. Kennedy returned to
the work of Dewey and read into him postmodern themes that were latent in
Dewey's work. Kennedy concluded that intersubjectivity, the idea that there
was a unique space created between individuals that aorded rich, philosoph-
ical meaning-making and that this was at least, if not more important, than
individual meaning-making.
The theme of relating is an important one in philosophy of education.
One of the most trenchant criticisms of contemporary schooling is that it has
borrowed from the practices and language of business management a wholly
inappropriate vocabulary and set of beliefs about the relationship between
children, teachers and the subject-matter of learning. The `Taylorist' model
of factory-production focuses on productivity, inputs and outputs and the
whole system of production in order to focus on the most important business
value of eciency. Respected critics such Biesta have argued strongly against
the appropriateness of such business models for considering relationships of
teaching and learning (Biesta, 2006, 2010, 2014). For example, he tackles
what he calls `learnication' culture where a child's `learning' is commodied,
treated as a discrete quantity, and which can somehow be poured or placed
into children. Learning however cannot be separated from teaching, and when
learning is referred to without mention of teaching this isolates the learner,
and relegates to the margins the relationships that are at the heart of the
educational process. These relationships are reduced to a technical manage-
ment process, what we referred to earlier in the Aristotelian account as techne
rather than full, wise judgement. These business models can have a tragic im-
pact on a teacher's career as vocation and Higgins has recently written on the
dangers of the professional who either burns in or burn out of their profession
rather than maintaining their vocation as a living and vital inquiry over their
working life-course.
As a nal speculation I would like to consider how a variety of ideas can be
brought to bear on the idea of educational judgement. Rosa Braidotti writes
about radical feminism from a posthuman perspective using the idea of no-
madic subjectivity. Hers is an enormously rich and complex philosophy and
at rst glance not entirely relevant to education and professional judgement.
However, certain of her ideas might be translated into our concerns in this
chapter. For example, she Braidotti claims she writes `cartographies' (2011:
46) - intellectual landscape gardening that provides horizons or frames or ref-
erences that allow her to navigate whilst never actually belonging anywhere
but merely visiting. How would pedagogical judgement look that was based
on nomadic cartography? Would a teacher be charged with understanding
the terrain created and inhabited by children? Would their professional train-
ing address questions such as how to visit such terrains sustainably, without
wrecking invasive and permanent damage, like oil-drillers in the Arctic? These
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are philosophical questions about ethics and would require a completely dif-
ferent sensibility and orientation, and a radically dierent professional toolkit,
than the ones currently being promoted in Initial teacher Education. In an-
other example, Braidotti talks very dierently about identity than we are used
to in everyday language. For her identity is something we construct after the
event, rather than being the thing that creates the event or causes the action;
we look back afterwards and say `there I was' rather than `I am here' - it is
a `retrospective notion' (p.40). What might judgement be like for a teacher
whose professional identity is radically uncertain and always under doubt and
examination? I think we would need very dierent types of school if not soci-
ety. And that is the gift of philosophy, to be concerned not with what is the
case but with how things ought or should be.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have introduced three traditions of philosophical thinking
that understand judgement very dierently from one another. I relate these
forms to educational and P4C practice before going on to discuss the dif-
culty in making judgements when each position oers a stance to critique
one's practice no matter how well justied one's judgement is. I argue that
there is no place that one can stand that allows an objective judgement and
that good practitioners come to live with this contingency and build this into
their practice by being sensitive to negotiaiton, relationship and by being an
educational `visitor' to the pedagogical encounter. In a later chapter I relate
these concerns more explicitly to models of teaching and teaching expertise.
Chapter 6
Notes
Chapter 5 Pedagogic judgement
1. Metaphysics gains its name from being the book immediately after the
`Physics' in Aristotle's library. We use the term now to refer to concepts that
are not immediately empirically establishable such as truth, causation, justice.
Some philosophers have regarded metaphysics as unjustiable nonsense (Ayer
)
2. What my own children never knew was that when I did this I could not
actually see beyond the end of my own nose
3. As an example of `turtles all the way down' my approach here of staying
within philosophy as a way of navigating between traditions can also be chal-
lenged. In my doctoral thesis (link to repo) I used the philosopher Richard
Rorty to argue that there can be no reasons to philosophically prefer one
tradition over another. Each tradition creates lacunae or gaps that have to
addressed by other traditions
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